

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LIMA 10371 090243Z

63

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 126512

O R 090144Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY LIMA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3072

INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 10371

EXDIS

FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AR

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VIGNES

REF: (A) STATE 267952; (B) STATE 269203

1. I MET WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER VIGNES AND PULIT IN VIGNES' HOTEL SUITE ON DECEMBER 7 FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR. HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THE BUENOS AIRES MEETING.

2. THE CONFERENCE MUST BE A SUCCESS. THE RECIPE FOR A SUCCESS, IN HIS VIEW, HAS TWO INGREDIENTS: THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CUBANS WITHOUT CONTROVERSY OR TEARS, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FEW, QUITE MODEST BUT REASONABLY CONCRETE RESULTS.

3. WE SPENT MOST OF OUR TIME ON CUBA. HE REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT, OR ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED, THE BUENOS AIRES MEETING WAS TO HAVE BEEN THE SECOND STAGE OF THE NEW DIALOGUE. HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED IT THAT WAY. THE QUITO MEETING COMPLICATED MATTERS. HE NOTED THAT WHEN HE MET SECRETARY KISSINGER IN ROME HE HAD URGED THE UNITED STATES TO PLAY QTE. A HELPFUL ROLE END QTE. AT QUITO. HE EVIDENTLY FELT HIS PLEA HAD NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD. I SUGGESTED THAT OUR HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE AT THE QUITO MEETING WAS INDEED HIGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE AND REPRESENTED A DISTINCT ADVANCE IN OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LIMA 10371 090243Z

4. VIGNES COMMENTED THAT QUITO ILLUSTRATED THE VITAL NECESSITY OF REFORMING THE RIO TREATY, IN HIS VIEW, THE RESULT AT QUITO HAD BEEN QTE. ANTI-DEMOCRATIC END QTE. IT REPRESENTED THE POSITION OF ONLY THREE COUNTRIES. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE ECUADOREAN REVISION OF THE RIO TREATY TO PERMITTING SCTIONS TO BE REPEALED BY A MAJORITY VOTE. HE WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS. PULIT CONFIRMED THAT INDEED THE RIO TREATY CHANGE HAD MOVED FORWARD LAST WEEK WITH OUR CONSENT. VIGNES THOUGHT THIS A POSITIVE STEP. BUT WE AGREED, AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE CHANGE COULD BE MADE EFFECTIVE, UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, BEFORE THE BUENOS AIRES MEETING.

5. WE THEN TURNED TO THE QUESTION WHETHER CUBA SHOULD BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BUENOS AIRES MEETINGS, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES -- THAT IS TO SAY, WITH THE 1964 RESOLUTIONS TECHNICALLY STILL IN EFFECT, WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES (PROBABLY INCLUDING VENEZUELA) HAVING RE-ESTABLISHED RELATIONS AND WITH A CHANGE IN THE VOTING FORMULA IN THE RIO TREATY IN THE OFFING. HE EXPANDED ON THE NOTIONS SET FORTH IN HIS NOVEMBER 25 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY, AS FOLLOWS: HE FEELS THAT THE CUBAN ISSUE COULD BE DEEPLY DIVISIVE TO NEW DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS AT BUENOS AIRES. IF CUBA IS NOT INVITED, THE CUBAN ISSUE IS CERTAIN TO BE DISCUSSED. HENCE, IN HIS VIEW, IF THE UNITED STATES CONSENTS, CUBA SHOULD BE INVITED, ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT NO ASPECT OF THE CUBAN QUESTION WOULD BE INJECTED INTO THE CONVERSATIONS, AND THAT THE AGENDA WILL BE DEFINED TO EXCLUDE CUBAN-RELATED CONTROVERSY. I TOLD HIM THAT, TO MY MIND, THIS REPRESENTED AN INTERESTING AMPLIFICATION OF HIS LETTER. I POINTED OUT, ALONG THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSED DRAFT REPLY (REFTEL A) THAT OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVITATION TO CUBA WAS RELATED TO THE PROBABLE REACTION OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. WE WOULD NOT WANT THE QUESTION OF AN INVITATION TO CUBA TO EVOLVE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SEEM TO REQUIRE US AND OTHERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN A MEETING IN WHICH CUBA WOULD PARTICIPATE OR ONE IN WHICH, FOR INSTANCE, CHILE WOULD PARTICIPATE. VIGNES REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS PURPOSE TO ARRANGE A MEETING IN WHICH ALL WOULD WILLINGLY PARTICIPATE, AND THAT IF WE WERE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN CUBA AND CHILE ARGENTINA WOULD PREFER CHILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LIMA 10371 090243Z

6. WE THEN REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF LACK OF ASSURANCES, AGAIN ALONG THE LINES OF REFTTEL A. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CONSIDERATION. HE ADMITTED THAT HE WAS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT HE COULD SECURE ENOUGH IN THE WAY OF ASSURANCES FROM CUBA AS TO ITS BEHAVIOR TO SATISFY THE MISGIVINGS OF THOSE WHO HAD VOTED NO AT QUITO. BUT HE WANTED OUR REACTION BEFORE HE EVEN TRIED. I REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH

I KNEW THE SECRETARY HAD ALREADY GIVEN GREAT CONSIDERATION TO THE MINISTER'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 25, I DID NOT KNOW WHAT POSITION WE WOULD TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION AS HE NOW HAD ELABORATED IT. I PROMISED THAT WE WOULD HAVE A RESPONSE IN HIS HANDS WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.

7. VIGNES ADDED A NOTE OF DISAPPOINTMENT AT WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS A RIGID ATTITUDE ON OUR PART AS TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION QUESTIONS DURING THE RECENT POLICY PLANNING TALKS IN BUENOS AIRES. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED WE COULD IMPROVE OUR POSTURE BEFORE THE MFM.

8. HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO GRUMBLE ABOUT PINOCHET'S DECISION NOT TO COME TO LIMA. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT IS ONLY ROA, NOT FIDEL, WHO IS ATTENDING FOR CUBA.

COMMENT:

1. THIS CONVERSATION SUPERSEDES THE PROPOSED REPLY FROM THE SECRETARY (REFTEL A). I NOW THINK WE SHOULD HOLD OFF REVISING THAT REPLY UNTIL FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS HERE IN LIMA. VIGNES IS QUITE CONTENT FOR THE MOMENT.

2. ROA HAS ARRIVED. IF THE PRESS HERE IS A FAIR BAROMETER, HIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT WAS MILD ENOUGH. CARVAJAL HAS TOLD US THAT CHILE'S ATTITUDE ON CUBAN PARTICIPATION AT BUENOS AIRES WILL BE AFFECTED BY CUBA'S BEHAVIOR HERE. WE MIGHT EXPECT THAT THE SAME IS TRUE FOR BLANCO. ROA HAS ALREADY SAID HERE THAT CUBA WILL ACCEPT IF INVITED TO THE BUENOS AIRES MEETING.

3. VIGNES HAS SAID THAT HE WANTS OUR RESPONSE BEFORE HE MOVES TOO FAR ON THE INVITATION TO CUBA. BUT I THINK THAT HE AND PULIT WILL MAKE SOME SOUNDINGS AD REFERENDUM NEVERTHELESS, AT LEAST WITH CARVAJAL, BLANCO AND PERHAPS ALSO LIEVANO OF COLOMBIA, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LIMA 10371 090243Z

THE VENEZUELAN AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS.

4. BRAZIL IS REPRESENTED BY A GENERAL WHOSE CREDENTIALS ARE HIS UTTER IGNORANCE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. SO THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF OUR GETTING A LINE ON THE BRAZILIAN POSITION HERE. SEE SEPTTEL.
DEAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974LIMA10371
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740356-0420
From: LIMA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741250/aaaabqze.tel
Line Count: 161
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: (A) STATE 267952; (B) STATE 269203
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 MAY 2002 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <25 MAR 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VIGNES
TAGS: PFOR, AR, PE, (VIGNES)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005